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I
INTRODUCTION

Mass tort cases, involving hundreds or thousands of injured plaintiffs,
multiple defendants, and complex scientific and technical issues, present
unique and complex problems for both courts and litigants. From the
defendants' point of view, mass tort litigation raises the specter of protracted
and costly proceedings with the potential for devastating financial loss. For
plaintiffs, mass tort litigation offers the potential for seemingly endless years
of legal maneuvering in the quest to obtain compensation for serious and
disabling injuries. There is widespread agreement among attorneys, judges,
and policymakers that the proliferation of certain mass tort controversies in
recent years has severely stressed and overburdened judicial resources.
Some courts and litigants have sought to address the problems
engendered by mass tort litigation by developing methods to settle the mass
of claims in the aggregate and thereafter implementing administrative
procedures for distributing compensation to individuals. This type of
approach was used effectively to resolve two of the largest mass tort
controversies to arise-the Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation' and
2
the Dalkon Shield personal injury cases.
The purpose of this article is to examine such methods of resolving mass
tort litigation. It is intended as a road map of issues that must be considered
in attempting an aggregate settlement of a mass tort litigation and in
developing a viable, efficient administrative system for delivering
compensation.
The remainder of the article is divided into three sections. The first
section discusses the issues involved in attempting a comprehensive,
aggregate settlement in the mass tort context. The second section examines
the development of a mechanism for distributing funds to individual plaintiffs.
The article concludes with a case history of the Dalkon Shield litigation, which
provides an illustrative example of the issues involved in aggregating claims
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and of various options for distributing compensation through an
administrative mechanism.
In each of these areas, the intent of this article is to raise the various issues
that will arise in attempting an aggregate settlement of a mass tort
controversy and, where appropriate, to offer some options that might be
considered in addressing these issues. Although each case will present new
and unique issues, it is hoped that this article will help guide parties who find
themselves embroiled in such a controversy to a fair and effective resolution
of the matter.
II
SETTLEMENT:

ACHIEVING AGGREGATE RESOLUTION OF A MASS TORT

The high costs and financial risks associated with case-by-case litigation of

thousands of claims provide powerful incentives to seek alternative means of
resolving a mass tort controversy. Yet the very nature of mass tort litigation,
with hundreds of parties spread over a variety of jurisdictions, makes it
extraordinarily difficult to achieve a comprehensive resolution involving all
parties. This section of the article will analyze the issues involved in reaching
a comprehensive settlement of a "typical" mass tort litigation,3 starting with a
brief overview of the problems of mass tort litigation and concluding with
issues of concern in developing a settlement agreement or resolution plan.
A.

The Problems of Mass Tort Litigation: Incentives to Settle

1. High Litigation Costs. The financial costs of resolving mass tort
controversies, particularly those involving claims of injury or disease due to
exposure to a "toxic" substance, through the traditional tort system can be
massive. Mass tort litigation often involves complex technical and legal issues
that require analysis by numerous (costly) experts. The multiplicity of parties
engenders protracted and duplicative legal proceedings, which increases the
already high litigation costs.
In the Agent Orange litigation, one of the largest class action toxic tort
cases ever brought, the parties estimated that the initial trial could last as long
as eighteen months, and that subsequent appeals and other proceedings
4
might last as long as a decade.
3. The term "mass tort litigation" is used to describe a variety of types of tort claims ranging
from a single accident involving numerous victims, such as an airplane crash, to a controversy
involving widespread exposure to a harmful product. Some of the concepts and issues discussed in
this article are most applicable to the category of mass tort known as "toxic torts," involving claims
that exposure to a product has produced widespread injury.
4. See Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange On Trial 5 (Harvard U Press, 1986). The discovery costs
alone in the Agent Orange case were astounding:
[I]n the Agent Orange litigation, solely with respect to the government contract defense, the
defendants took more than 200 depositions of former or current government employees.
Assume that the depositions were performed by outside counsel and that each deposition
took two days. Assume that the defendants' counsel each spent one day preparing for each
deposition and another day summarizing and reviewing. Assume that the law firms used
teams of two attorneys with an hourly billing rate for each attorney of $150. The calculation
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In fact, the cost of litigating "mass" tort claims can exceed the amount
eventually paid in damages to plaintiffs. One study of asbestos litigation, for
example, estimated that plaintiffs on the average receive only 37 percent of
the litigation expenses incurred by defendants and their insurers, which
means that almost two-thirds of the total amount spent is relegated to
attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses. 5 Such litigation expense-topayout ratios are obviously undesirable for both litigants and society; from all
points-of-view, it is most desirable to provide appropriate compensation to
the victim with a minimum of transactional costs.
2. Indirect Costs/Loss of Productivity. In addition to the direct costs of
litigation, parties and litigants in mass tort controversies incur a variety of
indirect costs. For defendants (generally corporate entities), indirect costs
include the loss in productivity that results from the diversion of resources
from production to the defense of litigation and the loss of goodwill that can
result from adverse media attention. The threat of uncertain future liability
can increase the cost of doing business by inflating insurance premiums,
depressing stock prices, and raising credit terms.
For plaintiffs, mass tort litigation imposes undesirable personal costs.
Individuals suffering from serious or fatal diseases desperately need financial
assistance. But the complexities of the litigation and the defendants'
tendency to employ aggressive litigation strategies so as to minimize a
potentially devastating financial situation can lead to significant delays in the
final resolution of plaintiffs' claims. The proliferation of asbestos personal
injury cases, which has outstripped the ability of the courts and the parties to
6
dispose of cases, inevitably will lead to further delays.
3. Large and Uncertain Liabilities. For all parties, mass tort litigation presents
extraordinary risks. Defendants confront the possibility of devastating
financial loss if hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs recover large
compensatory damage awards. 7 Plaintiffs risk the possibility of little or no
compensation after years of burdensome legal proceedings and emotional
strain.
begins with: 200 depositions x 4 days x 8 hours = 6400 hours. The next step is 6400 hours
x 14 attorneys (2 for each defendant) x $150 per hour = a total cost for attorneys of
$13,440,000 for deposition costs for this aspect of the suit, leaving out transcript fees, travel
costs, and other expenses. This cost would be multiplied several times over in the taking of
depositions of the plaintiffs, the defendants, their physicians and expert witnesses.
Robert H. Sand, How Much Is Enough? Observations in Light of the Agent Orange Settlement, 9 Harv Envir L
Rev 283, 297-98 (1985).
5. James S. Kakalik, et al, Costs of Asbestos Litigation 40 (RAND, 1983).
6. See Order to Show Cause, In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation, No. 875, n3. (Judicial Panel
on MultiDistrict Litigation, January 17, 1991) (Number VI).
7. The number of companies that have declared bankruptcy in the face of soaring tort claims,
including the A.H. Robins Company (manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield) and the Manville
Corporation (manufacturer of asbestos-containing products), illustrates the enormous risks faced by
defendants in mass tort controversies. See generally, Kane vJohns-Manville Corp., 843 F2d 636 (2d Cir
1988).
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For all parties, mass tort litigation is fraught with uncertainty. In a mass
toxic tort case involving widespread exposure to a harmful product,
defendants are often unable to predict the total potential liability. The
number of persons exposed to the product who will suffer an injury and file a
claim may be impossible to determine. For plaintiffs, there is great
uncertainty about both the length of time that litigation of their claims will
consume, and the amount of money that may ultimately be available for
recovery from defendants.
4. Complex Legal and Scientific Issues. The burdens of mass tort litigation are
compounded in toxic tort cases by the complexities of the scientific issues
involved. Plaintiffs in such cases have traditionally faced extraordinary
difficulties in establishing a causal connection between the harmful product
and the particular injury. Scientific evidence that may provide the basis for
medical diagnoses or epidemiological studies is often not transferrable to the
legal system. Even where a plaintiff is able to establish general causation, that
is, an accepted causal relationship between a particular product and certain
types of diseases, the plaintiff may be unable to show that his or her disease
was caused by the product at issue and not some other agent.8 The difficulty
in establishing causation is magnified where there is a long latency period
between the exposure to a product and the development of the disease. As
the length of time between exposure and development of the disease
increases, the likelihood that the plaintiff's exposure to other agents that
might have caused the same disease also increases. 9 In addition, a long
latency period exacerbates problems of identifying the particular product that
caused the injury.
5. Demands on the Justice System. Mass tort litigation imposes undesirable
burdens on the courts and society as a whole. Litigation of mass tort
controversies involving hundreds or thousands of claims in a single forum or
proceeding severely stresses traditional legal procedures and conventions.
The sheer number of parties alone can make even the most routine pretrial
discovery proceeding or motion hearing exceedingly burdensome, and often
ties up judicial resources to the detriment of litigants in other cases.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, existing legal conventions
create undesirable incentives for the parties involved in mass tort
controversies and threaten to undermine traditional precepts of fairness and
8. The mere possibility of a particular product causing the defendant's disease is not enough.
A direct, or proximate, causal relationship between the defendant's product and the plaintiff's
disease must be established. The plaintiff, therefore, must "introduce evidence which affords a
reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant
was a substantialfactor in bringing about" the defendant's illness. William Lloyd Prosser, Handbook of
the Law of Torts, 41, 241 (West, 4th ed 1971) (emphasis added).
9. See generally Sheila B. Birnbaum, Tort Damagesfor Fear and Risk of Injury, 31 Prac Law 25
(1985); Lawrence B. Novey, Collective Judicial Management of Mass Toxic Tort Controversies: Lessons and
Issuesfrom the Agent Orange Litigation, 27 J Soc Sci & Med 1071 (1988); Aaron A. Twerski, With Liberty
and Justicefor Alt: An Essay on Agent Orange and Choice of Law, 52 Brooklyn L Rev 341 (1986); Paul
Sherman, Agent Orange and the Problems of the Indeterminate Plaintiff, 52 Brooklyn L Rev 369 (1986).
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equity on which our judicial system is based. The risks involved in mass tort
cases encourage the parties to engage in duplicative and aggressive litigation
of each issue, thus increasing the burden on the courts and the cost to
litigants. Increasing costs can affect the parties in disparate ways and may
lead to a final determination of the matter based principally on the parties'
relative abilities to pay attorneys' and other fees (or the plaintiffs' attorneys
willingness to undertake and finance such litigation) rather than on the merits
of the case. In addition, the distribution of individual cases over several
jurisdictions can lead to dramatically different results in essentially similar
cases. 10 This in turn may lead plaintiffs and defendants to utilize available
procedures to file, transfer, or remove cases to the most favorable forum, thus
increasing the burdens on those judicial facilities.
6. Criticisms of the Tort System-Pursuing Alternatives. The use of the existing
tort system to resolve mass tort controversies on a case-by-case basis has been
heavily criticized. Commentators and litigants have argued that the process is
too slow, too costly, and too erratic." Some observers charge that the current
system creates undesirable incentives for both plaintiffs and defendants.' 2
Contingent fee awards and the high costs of litigation encourage plaintiffs'
attorneys to file large numbers of cases, even if some claims are relatively
weak, in the hope of obtaining a package settlement. Defendants, who
generally have greater financial resources than plaintiffs or their attorneys,
may be better able to maintain an aggressive litigation posture and may
simply wear out the plaintiffs. Our legal conventions can also create
inequities. The judicial treatment of scientific evidence may deny
compensation to true victims of a harmful product, and the litigation of
individual claims at different times in different places with different juries and
different evidentiary rulings will result in inconsistent verdicts and
settlements.
These criticisms of the tort system have instigated a variety of proposals to
improve the management of mass tort controversies. Such proposals have
included development of legislative schemes designed to provide
compensation to victims through administrative mechanisms, "tort reform"
legislation, creation of specialized federal "national disaster" courts, and
development of methods to enhance the power of the courts. 1 3 To date,
however, no proposal for widescale modification of the current system of
10. See, for example, In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F2d 996, 1001 (3rd Cir 1986)
(Inconsistencies in verdicts make litigation look "more like roulette than jurisprudence."). See also
Comments of Judge Jack B. Weinstein, 5 Toxics L Rptr 1107 (February 6, 1991) (Litigation of
asbestos personal injury cases "take on aspects of a lottery.").
11. See generally Institute for Health Policy Analysis, Causation and Financial Compensationfor
Claims of Personal Injury from Toxic Chemical Exposure (Inst Health Pol'y Analysis, Georgetown U Med
Ctr, 1986) (Final Report of the Conference Panel, Lawrence B. Novey, reporter).
12. Id.
13. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, II
ColumJ Envir L I (1986).
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determining liability and delivering compensation in the mass tort context has
been adopted.
At the same time, the financial and political costs, extraordinary risks, and
difficulty of mass tort litigation furnish powerful incentives for both the
litigants and the courts involved to seek a comprehensive resolution of the
matter outside the traditional litigation mode, for example, through
settlement.14 In the absence of any viable alternative, parties involved in mass
tort controversies have sought to develop innovative methods to resolve such
cases in the aggregate. As noted above, in two of the largest mass tort
controversies to arise, the Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation and the
Dalkon Shield personal injury cases, the parties and courts developed
methods of settling the mass of claims in the aggregate and then established
5
administrative mechanisms for distributing funds to individual claimants.'
The remainder of this section of the article discusses issues involved in
consolidating claims to make a comprehensive resolution possible and factors
to consider in developing an aggregate settlement.
B.

Achieving a Comprehensive Settlement: Prerequisites to a Settlement

There are three key prerequisites to a comprehensive and final resolution
of a mass tort case: (1) aggregation of claims (both present and potential
future); (2) determination of the aggregate liability; and (3) allocation of
responsibility among multiple defendants. Once the parties reach agreement
on these central issues, they should be able to forge a satisfactory and
workable settlement agreement.
1. Aggregative Procedures. In order to achieve a comprehensive resolution of
all claims arising out of a particular mass tort situation (whether through
litigation or through settlement), the cases must be consolidated. Several
14. Depending on the posture of the cases and the particular factual situation, the parties may
view settlement as a risky alternative despite the problems inherent in litigation. From the
defendant's perspective, for example, a settlement that does not achieve a comprehensive resolution
of all pending and future claims is risky because it may encourage additional claims and set
precedents for recovery in other cases arising from the same mass tort. Thus, if the particular mass
tort has not yet reached a stage where the bulk of claims has been filed or at least identified,
settlement may not be attractive to defendants. Defendants considering settlement of mass tort
litigation must also consider the potential impact on insurance coverage. Insurance carriers may
contest the insureds' determination that a settlement is desirable, particularly where legal issues such
as scientific causation arguably make a finding of liability unlikely. Insurance coverage disputes
might also arise in the context of a settlement, particularly when relevant issues such as time and type
of injury or the liability of codefendants have not been resolved in the litigation process.
From the plaintiffs' point of view, the risks associated with settlement are more straightforward.
Quite simply, in determining whether to settle, the plaintiffs must weigh the amount of recovery that
could be obtained through settlement against the costs of and likely recovery that will be obtained
through litigation. If there is no previous litigation experience on which to assess settlement offers,
settling plaintiffs face the potential for a significantly lower, albeit speedier recovery.
15. See, for example, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F Supp 1396 (ED NY
1985). The Dalkon Shield case is discussed in detail in Part IV.
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techniques are available to centralize mass tort litigation, and the degree of
centralization will vary depending upon the technique used. 16
a. Multi-district litigationprocedure. Pretrial proceedings of cases pending
in several federal district courts can be coordinated under the direction of the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, pursuant to the U.S. Code. 17 This
multi-district litigation procedure, which provides for the transfer of cases
from all federal courts to one federal judge for control of preliminary
motions, discovery, and settlement, has proven useful in several cases.' 8 In
the Agent Orange case, for example, hundreds of cases filed by Vietnam
veterans claiming injury as a result of exposure to "Agent Orange" and other
herbicides during the Vietnam War were consolidated through multi-district
litigation rules in one federal district court.' 9 This technique is limited,
however, to cases in federal courts, although some state laws permit
consolidation of cases pending within the state. 20
b. The class action as a consolidation device. A potentially more
comprehensive method of consolidating mass tort litigation is the class action
device. 2 ' Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the
certification of class actions in the federal courts. Under Rule 23, an action
may be certified as a class action only if the members of the proposed class
meet

specific

requirements

involving

(1)

numerosity

of parties;

(2)

commonality of legal and factual issues; (3) typicality of the claims and
defenses of the class representative; and (4) adequacy of representation.
Assuming these requirements are satisfied, the action must meet additional
16. See generally Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Resolution of Mass Torts: Toward a Framework
for Evaluation of Aggregative Procedures (RAND, 1988) ("Resolution of Mass Torts"); Roger H. Transgrud,
Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L Rev 779 (1985).
17. 42 USC § 1407(a) (1982).
18. Weinstein, 11 Colum J Envir L at 22 n57 (cited in note 13). This consolidation technique
was used with only limited success by district courts handling a multiplicity of early suits involving
injury from use of the Dalkon Shield. See In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F2d 709, 712 (4th Cir 1989).
19. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 800 F2d 1415 (2d Cir 1986).
20. See, for example, Md Circuit Ct R Civ Proc 2-503 (Michie, 1991); Cal Civ Proc Code
§§ 404.1-404.8 (West, 1989). U.S. District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein has suggested that
Congress should consider legislation that would allow transfer of both federal and state cases to a
single state forum. Weinstein, 11 Colum J Envir L at 24 (cited in note 13). See also Am Bar Ass'n
Commission on Mass Torts, Report and Recommendations (ABA, 1989). Multi-district litigation bills
were introduced in the United States House of Representatives in both the Spring and Fall of 1989
but were not passed. HR 3152, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (1989); HR 3406, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (1989).
21. Unlike multi-district litigation consolidations, the class action device can embrace both
actions that have been filed and claims of persons who might manifest injury in the future. For indepth discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of class actions in mass tort settings, see Linda S.
Mullenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 Tex L Rev 1039
(1986); Novey, 27J Soc Sci & Med 1071 (cited in note 9); Peterson & Selvin, Resolution of Mass Torts
(cited in note 16); Weinstein, 11 ColumJ Envir L at 28 (cited in note 13); Spencer Williams, Mass Tort
Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, reprinted in 98 FRD 323 (1983) (originally presented as a speech to
the Multi-District Litigation Panel, Carefree, Arizona, December 9, 1982); Irving R.M. Panzer &
Thomas Earl Patton, Utilizing the Class Actions Device in Mass Tort Litigation, 21 Tort & Ins L J 560
(1986).
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requirements regarding the fairness and efficiency of the class action
procedure as opposed to individual adjudication.
Historically, many courts have rejected attempts to use the class action
device in mass tort situations. This reluctance stems in part from the Advisory
Committee's Note regarding Rule 23, which states that "mass accident" cases
are ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likely presence
of significant questions that would affect the individuals in the case in different
ways. 22 In the early stages of the Dalkon Shield litigation, for example, a
number of courts denied several attempts to certify a plaintiff class on the
23
ground that individual causation issues made class treatment inappropriate.
Recently, however, courts have begun to recognize the practical advantages of
the class action device in handling mass tort controversies. 24 As one
commentator has observed, the reluctance to certify mass tort class actions
seems to be fading "in light of what is often an overwhelming need to create
an orderly, efficient means for adjudicating hundreds or thousands of related
25
claims."
Courts that have been receptive to the use of the class action device in
mass tort cases have been motivated by both the usefulness of the device in
managing the litigation as well as a belief that class certification would
facilitate a mass settlement. 26 In the Agent Orange product liability litigation,
for instance, Judge Weinstein certified a class of Vietnam veterans and certain
of their family members who sought recovery for injuries suffered as a result
of the veterans' exposure to herbicides in Vietnam. 27 Judge Weinstein noted
that "a class-wide finding of causation may serve to resolve the claims of
22. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the U.S. District Courts, reprinted in
39 FRD 69, 103 (1966) (Rule 23 advisory committee note). For a comprehensive discussion of the
historical evolution of the application of Rule 23, see In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F2d at 727-47.
23. See Rosenfeld v AH Robins Co, 63 AD2d 11, 407 NYS2d 196 (NY App Div), appeal dismissed,
46 NY2d 731, 413 NYS2d 374, 385 NE2d 1301 (1978) (upholding rejection of class certification
because of the problem of individual causality); In re Northern Dist of Cal "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products
Liability Litigation, 693 F2d 847 (9th Cir 1982) (vacating district court's certification of a nation-wide
class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on issue of punitive damages and a state-wide class under Rule 23(b)(3)
on issue of liability), cert denied, 459 US 1171 (1983).
24. See for example, In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F2d at 743;Jenkins v Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F2d
468, 473 (5th Cir 1986); In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F2d 996, 1009 (3d Cir 1986), cert denied,
479 US 852 (1987); In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 100 FRD 718 (ED NY 1983), aff'd,
818 F2d 145 (2d Cir 1987), cert denied, 484 US 1004 (1988).
25. Herbert B. Newberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: Implications of theJohns-MansvilleBankruptcy Action
Trial 53 (February 1986).
26. Whether class certification pursuant to Rule 23 is proper solely for the purpose of
settlement is the subject of some debate. The only federal court decision that granted class
certification strictly for purposes of settlement in a mass tort action, In re Bendectin Product Liability
Litigation, 102 FRD 239, 240 (SD Ohio 1984), was invalidated by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
749 F2d 300 (6th Cir 1984). As noted by the court in that case, however, courts in cases involving
numerous parties, although not mass-tort cases, have granted class certification for settlement
purposes. See also In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F2d at 740 and cases cited therein ("[I]f not a ground
for certification per se, certainly settlement should be a factor, and an important factor to be
considered when determining certification.").
27. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 100 FRD 718 (ED NY 1983), mandamus denied
sub nom In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F2d 858 (2d Cir), cert denied, 465 US 1067 (1984).
In a later appeal involving the settlement ultimately reached in the Agent Orange case, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the appropriateness of the class certification but expressed some
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individual members, in a way that determinations in individual cases would
not, by enhancing the possibility of settlement among the parties and with the
28

federal government."-

There are some limitations on the use of the class action to achieve a
comprehensive resolution of a mass tort litigation. For example, plaintiffs
have the right to opt out of a voluntary class.2 9 Moreover, a court presiding
over a class action case is required to approve the settlement. (Case law
generally provides that the court must decide whether the settlement is fair,
reasonable, and adequate.3 0 ) This determination involves giving notice of the
settlement to, and receiving comment from, representative class members. 3 '
With thousands of plaintiffs located around the country, some courts might
find this requirement overly burdensome.
c. Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code as a means of centralizingmass tort litigation.
A defendant's decision to seek protection under the bankruptcy laws can
effectively centralize mass tort litigation. Bankruptcy, of course, is not an
option that may be selected by any defendant faced with a mass tort situation.
However, an enterprise whose financial survival is threatened by the expense
of defending and paying claims arising out of a mass tort (or by other factors)
may be able to effect consolidation of the cases after filing for reorganization
under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 32 Thus, the defendant may be able
33
to resolve, in one proceeding, the multitude of claims.

concern as to whether the various individual issues might overwhelm the common factors. In re Agent
Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F2d 145 (2d Cir 1987), cert denied, 108 S Ct 695 (1988).
28. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 100 FRD 718. See also In re School Asbestos
Litigation, 789 F2d at 1009 ("Concentration of individual damage suits in one forum can lead to
formidable problems, but the realities of litigation should not be overlooked in theoretical musings.
Most tort cases settle, and the preliminary maneuverings in litigation today are designed as much, if
not more, for settlement purposes than for trial. Settlements of class actions often result in savings
for all concerned."); Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?. Suggested Revision of
Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HarvJ Legis 461, 480 (1988)
("[I]n recent years, several federal judges have explicitly recognized the effect of class certification on
the likelihood of pre-judgment settlement in mass-tort suits, and have apparently allowed such
recognition to influence their decision to certify class actions."); Transgrud, 70 Cornell L Rev at 835
(cited in note 16) (class certification as a pretrial joinder device to facilitate group settlements is both
proper and desirable).
29. Weinstein, 11 ColumJ Envir L at 28 (cited in note 13) (enumerating limits of the class action
device and posing some unresolved questions). Regarding the specific issue of opt-out rights for
class members, see In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F2d at 744-45 and sources cited therein.
30. See, for example, West Virginia v Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F2d 1079, 1085 (2d Cir 1971).
31. See Fed R Civ P 23; In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F Supp 740, 758-59 (ED
NY 1984).
32. 11 USC §§ 1101-1146 (1982).
33. Pursuant to section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code and the court's general equitable powers, a
bankruptcy court has the power to stay all proceedings against the debtor, and in some cases, related
actions against co-defendants of the debtor or of third parties. See A. H. Robins Co. v Piccinin, 788
F2d 994, 1002-04 (4th Cir), cert denied, 479 US 876 (1986). A district court sitting in bankruptcy
also has the authority to fix the venue of tort cases pending against the debtor and to order, subject
to due process notice and opportunity for hearing, that all such cases be tried in the district court in
which the bankruptcy case is pending. 28 USC § 157(b)(5). The court sitting in bankruptcy
therefore has considerable power to centralize mass tort litigation against the debtor into a single
forum and to prevent the danger of conflicting judgments in a multiplicity of forums.
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The ultimate goal of a bankruptcy proceeding under chapter 11 is the
development of a plan of reorganization that will both rehabilitate the debtor
and resolve the claims of creditors, including tort claimants. The bankruptcy
court has the power, and the obligation, to estimate a debtor's aggregate
liability for personal injury claims in order to determine the feasibility of a
reorganization plan.3 4 This estimation of the value of all claims, in addition to
the initial centralization of all claims in a single forum, can lead to the
establishment of a mechanism for the resolution of claims without the resort
to litigation.
Use of the reorganization provisions of chapter 11 to resolve tort liabilities
that threaten the financial survival of a corporation is controversial and may
not be feasible or practical in many situations. 3 5 Moreover, the process does
pose some risks for the parties involved in mass tort litigation. From the
defendant's perspective, there is the risk that the cloud of uncertainty induced
by the bankruptcy process will be more financially harmful than the cloud of
tort liabilities that would exist outside of the bankruptcy forum.3 6 For the
plaintiff, there is the risk that claims will be undercompensated relative to the
potential recovery in court and relative to the claims of other creditors, such
as those holding secured claims against the debtor. 3 7 In addition, the
bankruptcy process may delay the resolution of claims filed before the
bankruptcy action began.
Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances, reorganization under chapter
11 can result in the centralization of mass tort claims, thus facilitating the
development of a reasonable plan that will rehabilitate the financial status of
an enterprise facing massive tort liability while at the same time assuring fair
and consistent resolution of claims. Both the Manville Corporation (an
asbestos manufacturer) and the A. H. Robins Company (the manufacturer of
the Dalkon Shield) have effectively centralized and resolved mass tort
controversies through chapter 1 1.38 The Robins bankruptcy is discussed in
detail below.
34. 11 USC § 502(c)(1). See also 28 USC § 157(b)(2); A. H. Robins Co. v Piccinin, 788 F2d at
1011-12.
35. See Kaighn Smith, Jr., Beyond the Equity Power of Bankruptcy Courts: Toxic Tort Liabilities in
Chapter 11 Cases, 38 Me L Rev 391 (1986) (arguing that use of chapter 11 as forum for resolution of
massive tort liabilities is advisable only under limited circumstances-namely, if there is minimal
corporate debt relative to tort liability, if uncompensated tort victims outnumber those who obtained
compensation before the corporation entered bankruptcy, and if future tort claims will undoubtedly
drive the corporation into insolvency-and questioning the power of bankruptcy courts, even under
such circumstances, to create a single compensation mechanism for settlement of debtors' present
and future obligations to tort victims, absent legislative reform of bankruptcy law); Gregory A.
Bibler, The Status of Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 61 Am Bankr LJ 145
(1987) (outlining public policy arguments against use of bankruptcy proceedings for comprehensive
resolution of tort liabilities and arguing that toxic tort claims arising from repetition activities of a
debtor are not dischargeable in bankruptcy until they have accrued under applicable state
nonbankruptcy law).
36. See Smith, 38 Me L Rev at 445 (cited in note 35).
37. See Bibler, 61 Am Bankr LJ at 147 n13 (cited in note 35).
38. See Kane v Johns-Manville, 843 F2d 636 (2d Cir 1988); In re A.H. Robins, 88 BR 742 (ED Va
1988).
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2. Determining the Defendants' Liability: Establishing an Aggregate Cap on Liability.
Once the mass of claims has been aggregated, litigants seeking a
comprehensive and final settlement of all claims must determine an aggregate
value of the claims. Deciding on a figure that adequately accounts for all
claims-both present and future-in a mass tort controversy is complicated
and controversial. In mass toxic tort cases in particular, the universe of
potential plaintiffs is often unknown, and the claimants may suffer from a
number of different injuries that vary greatly in type and severity. Moreover,
the sheer number of parties involved makes a detailed, individualized analysis
of the nature and legitimacy of claims difficult, if not impossible.
In the Dalkon Shield controversy, an aggregate settlement value was
determined through a comprehensive analysis of a sample of past and
pending claims. As discussed more fully below, a profile of pending claims
was developed based on questionnaires distributed to claimants, and the
aggregate value was determined, in part, by applying historical settlement and
litigation results to the pending claims.
Although achieving finality by establishing an aggregate cap on liability is
attractive, particularly from the defendants' point of view, in some situations it
may be inappropriate or impossible. For example, when the number of future
claims is uncertain but potentially greater than existing claims, it may be
impossible to determine an aggregate value for the future claims that is
reasonable and acceptable to all parties. Similarly, if there are great
uncertainties regarding the nature of the claims among the universe of
plaintiffs, it may be impossible to determine the aggregate liability. The
Manville Corporation, for example, was unable to establish a cap on liability
in its bankruptcy plan. Rather, the plan provides for ongoing contributions of
assets to the trust established to pay individual claims.
As an alternative to establishing an aggregate value for all claims, present
and future, a settlement agreement might simply place a cap on liability for
pending claims and establish an open-ended formula that provides for
unanticipated future claims. This approach has the disadvantage of leaving all
parties with a degree of uncertainty. Plaintiffs might be concerned about
securing the defendants' obligations, and defendants will always be hampered
by the potential unknown liability. Another alternative might be to establish a
formula for individual payments, with certain caps on both individual
payments and aggregate payments in any given time period. Indeed, a
compensation formula approach is used quite frequently in class actions
involving consumer or securities claims.
3. Deciding Who Pays: Allocation Among Defendants. In a case involving
multiple defendants, one of the most difficult problems in reaching a
comprehensive resolution of the litigation is securing the agreement of all
defendants. Without the participation of other defendants in the settlement,
a defendant that has settled may face cross-claims and/or claims for
contribution or indemnity from jointly liable defendants that could nullify the
advantages gained by settling with plaintiffs.
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Once all defendants agree in principle to settle, they must establish some
system for allocating responsibility for paying the settlement amount. In each
case, the allocation process will differ depending on such factors as the
"homogeneity" of the product (that is, whether the harmful product is
contained in one product or a variety of products), the geographic
distribution of the various defendants' products, the nature of the distribution
chain, the presence of a company with a dominant market share, and the
availability of historical litigation data.
Defendants in a mass tort controversy may explore a variety of allocation
alternatives. In a products liability case, for example, defendants might
contribute to a compensation fund on the basis of market share. In many
instances, however, selection of the relevant market for determining market
share proves to be extraordinarily difficult and controversial. If a product has
been distributed widely over a period of years, defendants are likely to
contend that each company's market share is different depending on
geographic location and the time period at issue. Moreover, if the harmful
substance was contained in a variety of different types of products, a market
share allocation will be nearly impossible.
Contributions toward the settlement could also be allocated pro rata based
on a statistical analysis of the degree of harm caused by each particular
defendant. Factors affecting this determination would include not only the
defendant's market share but other factors, such as the relative level of
toxicity or the degree of defect in each defendant's product. This type of
allocation formula might be troublesome because defendants are likely to be
reluctant to admit to product defects.
An allocation based on an historical "litigation share" might be
appropriate in situations for which such data is available. 3 9 While this method
on its face might seem uncontroversial, in a mass tort situation, where cases
are located in a variety of jurisdictions, selection of the appropriate historical
data can be a divisive and difficult task.
Even if the defendants agree on the appropriate historical data, an
allocation based on historical litigation share will be successful only if the
nature of future claims mirrors claims filed in the past. The "Wellington
Agreement," a revolutionary attempt to centralize and resolve the burgeoning
number of personal injury cases filed against asbestos companies by pooling
assets of defendants and their insurers on the basis of producer shares, failed
40
in part because of changes in the type and source of claims filed.
39. As used in this article, "litigation share" refers to the portion of the overall compensatory
award or settlement paid by each defendant on average prior to the consolidated settlement.
40. The asbestos defendants are manufacturers, distributors, and suppliers of a wide variety of
types of asbestos containing products, varying from insulation materials to gaskets and rubber
products containing some asbestos as well as (in some jurisdictions) contractors that installed
products or owners of buildings constructed with the products. While insulation manufacturers
might be willing to pay a relatively greater share of compensation to insulation workers, such
companies are less willing to pay the same share for claims made by tire workers, The Wellington
Agreement included an adjustable producer shares formula based on historical data on the
characteristics of claims made. After the agreement was in place, the mix of types of claims changed
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Forging a Settlement

1. Method of Settlement: Using Non-Binding Mediation as a Settlement Device. The
task of achieving agreement among the many parties involved in mass tort
litigation will likely require something beyond conventional settlement
negotiations and may well require the aid of an outside party to facilitate
settlement. Judges have increasingly taken on a more active role in
encouraging settlement, sometimes by appointing a special master to facilitate
negotiation among parties. 4 ' In addition, the parties themselves can seek the
aid of an outside party to facilitate negotiation.
Non-binding mediation-a process in which a neutral third party helps the
parties arrive at settlement proposals-is a particularly advantageous means
of conducting settlement negotiations. 4 2 Perhaps the most attractive feature
of mediation is its completely voluntary and non-binding nature, which makes
participation in the process risk-free. If any party is dissatisfied at any time
with any aspect of the proceedings, that party can withdraw and is free to
engage in litigation or in other alternative methods of dispute resolution.
The informality and flexibility of the mediation process is another
advantage. The parties are free to set their own rules and procedures.
Mediation can thus be adapted to a variety of disputes and can be employed at
any stage in a dispute, whether or not litigation is already pending. If the
discovery stage of litigation has not yet been reached, the parties may choose
to incorporate a "mini-discovery" schedule into the mediation process.
The parties' ability to choose the mediator is another advantageous
feature of mediation. This ability to select a neutral outside party is
particularly useful in complex disputes involving mixed questions of law or
fact, where the parties may have more confidence in the mediator's, rather
than a jury's, ability to evaluate the case.
All of the above features make non-binding mediation an optimal device
for achieving settlement of mass tort litigation. Mediation's completely
voluntary and flexible nature allows the parties to explore avenues of
settlement without risk. Moreover, even if the mediation process does not
succeed in resolving all issues, it may help facilitate certain aspects of the
litigation process by encouraging the parties to focus their claims and assess
their options realistically. In addition, the mediation process often requires
the parties to present factual materials to both their opponents and the
mediator. Thus, the process may result in a streamlined and accelerated
discovery process.
considerably, according to some defendants, leading to objections and eventual dissolution of the
claims facility. See Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Centerfor Claims Resolution, 53 L & Contemp Probs 13
(Autumn 1990).
41. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F Supp 740, 752-53 (ED NY 1984).
42. For a more detailed explanation of the advantages of mediation as a method of resolving
disputes and an outline of a model procedure for mediation, see Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A
Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 Pepperdine L Rev S5 (1989).
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2. Fashioning a Settlement Agreement. Once the parties have engaged in the
settlement process, they still face the issue of fashioning acceptable settlement
terms. One common difficulty that can derail settlement negotiations is the
parties' tendency to attempt to resolve in the settlement agreement all issues
involved in delivering compensation to the individual plaintiffs. Attempting
to finalize all such details makes settlement nearly impossible.
The parties are more likely to achieve a comprehensive settlement by
focusing on the aggregate issues, such as the size, composition, and source of
the compensation fund. Although in many cases the parties will need to
prescribe general compensation guidelines in order to determine the
aggregate value of the claims, 43 the settlement agreement need not and
probably should not attempt to establish individual settlement amounts for
plaintiffs. Rather, the settlement agreement should prescribe the general
contours of the distribution mechanism. For instance, the agreement might
prescribe categories of compensable diseases or injuries and might list factual
and legal issues that may or may not be considered in determining settlement
values.
In the Dalkon Shield situation, for example, the trust agreement governing
payments for Dalkon Shield personal injury claims prescribes certain
procedures for settling claims and sets forth the factors that may be
considered in determining compensation levels. However, the trust
agreement leaves to the discretion and judgment of the trustees the
determination of appropriate levels of compensation and the weight to be
given to various individual factors, such as the type of proof presented to the
trustees for their evaluation of individual claims.

III
DISTRIBUTING THE FUND-DEVELOPING

AND IMPLEMENTING A

DISTRIBUTION MECHANISM

Once an overall, aggregate settlement has been achieved, attention must

turn to the mechanics of resolving the individual claims of hundreds,
sometimes thousands, of claimants. This involves the establishment of a
delivery system to distribute the settlement fund.
The critical issue in designing a mass tort settlement delivery system is
developing a procedure that will provide compensation to eligible claimants
efficiently and fairly without duplicating the delays and costs associated with
resolving claims through litigation. This poses a significant challenge,
however, because minimizing administrative costs almost inevitably means
43. In some cases, however, the settlement agreement will leave the determination of how to
distribute monies to individuals to the discretion of future administrators of the settlement fund. In
the Agent Orange case, for example, the settlement agreement contained no guidelines whatsoever
for compensating individuals. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F Supp 740, 862
(ED NY 1984). Once the parties agreed to an aggregate settlement amount, the court-appointed
special master developed a proposed distribution plan, which was ultimately adopted by the court.
See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F Supp 1369 (ED NY 1985).
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circumventing some of the traditional litigation procedures that determine
the value of an individual claim. For this reason, some critics have concluded
that administrative compensation schemes that call for a mass resolution of
cases or establish scheduled payments are dehumanizing, unfairly fail to take
account of significant differences among claimants, and are contrary to certain
44
fundamental values of our civil justice system.
The difficulty with a detailed, case-specific approach, however, is that a
compensation system that calls for in-depth, individualized scrutiny of each of
thousands or tens of thousands of claims impedes the speedy recovery that
makes settlement attractive to plaintiffs. In fact, the detailed examination of
individual claims is one of the principal factors that has made the resolution of
mass torts through the traditional litigation system an unsatisfactory process.
It is not within the scope of this article to participate more fully in this
debate regarding the appropriateness of different procedures for the mass
resolution of claims. It is the author's belief that an aggregate settlement
coupled with a streamlined compensation system can resolve individual claims
effectively without sacrificing fundamental fairness. Although some individual
factors traditionally accounted for in the litigation process may not receive the
same degree of consideration in an aggregate compensation scheme, a wellconceived and well-executed settlement distribution system that provides
speedy and consistent compensation is ultimately preferable to litigating
thousands of individual claims.
This section of the article focuses on establishing an administrative system
for resolving claims and distributing funds to individual plaintiffs. The
section addresses the issues of developing distribution procedures and
compensation levels, as well as the practical considerations involved in setting
up a claims resolution facility.
A.

Developing a Compensation Scheme

The most challenging aspect of establishing an administrative claims
resolution procedure is the development of the "compensation scheme" to be
used in distributing the settlement fund to the individual plaintiffs. In this
context, "compensation scheme" is meant to encompass both the procedural
44. Attempts to resolve mass tort controversies in the aggregate have generated much debate
among commentators. Critics argue that a mass resolution of claims involving the use of
administrative procedures to distribute payments is contrary to certain fundamental principles of the
civil justice system. The mass resolution of claims tends to preclude the parties' ability to vindicate
their actions and obtain a formal finding that characterizes the actions of their opponent as harmful
or wrong. See Novey, 27J Soc Sci & Med at 1071, 1079 (cited in note 9). This vindication of rights is
seen by some as a basic value of the tort system. Other critics argue that mass resolution procedures
inevitably result in overpayments to individuals with relatively weak claims and underpayments to
those with relatively strong claims. This criticism assumes that the current tort system places
consistent and appropriate values on claims. In reality, however, plaintiffs are likely to obtain vastly
different results in different jurisdictions. Even within a given jurisdiction, different juries and
different judges may place different values on similar claims. The debate regarding the use of
aggregative procedures in mass tort cases is discussed in Peterson & Selvin, Resolution of Mass Torts at
ix-x (cited in note 16).
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guidelines for distributing monies and the establishment of particular
settlement values.
1. Establishing Procedural Compensation Guidelines. A variety of procedural
mechanisms may be used in distributing the settlement monies to eligible
plaintiffs. These mechanisms range from a simple process not unlike a
workers'

compensation

system,

under which plaintiffs

submit specified

materials and receive a predetermined payment, to a more complex process
involving individual case evaluations or even case-by-case negotiations.
Obviously, as the process becomes more complex and individualized, it also
becomes more expensive and time consuming.
The selection of the appropriate procedural mechanism for distributing
money is closely tied to the issue of valuation of claims. As the valuation of
particular claims becomes more and more dependent on the individual
characteristics of the plaintiff, the procedures established for processing
claims will necessarily incorporate more individualized case-by-case analysis.
Finally, a compensation scheme need not rely on any single claims
resolution procedure. A compensation scheme that utilizes a variety of
mechanisms for distribution might be best able to meet the needs of different
categories of plaintiffs. The Dalkon Shield compensation scheme, explained
in Part IVE below, illustrates the spectrum of distribution mechanisms and
demonstrates that a single distribution plan can encompass a variety of
procedures.
2. Establishing Settlement Values. The determination of appropriate, fair, and
acceptable settlement values is critical to the success of any administrative
distribution mechanism. Not surprisingly, this task often proves to be the
most challenging and controversial aspect of the entire settlement process.
The following discussion examines the issues that must be considered and the
decisions that must be made in establishing settlement values.
a. Criteriafor payment. In formulating the settlement value for individual
claims, it is first necessary to establish the criteria that will be used in
determining eligibility for payment. Some of the key issues that must be
considered in developing such criteria are set forth below.
(i). Defining compensable injury and the universe of eligible plaintiffs. The first
criterion that must be established is the definition of a compensable injury. In
mass toxic tort controversies, the plaintiffs may allege that the harmful
substance caused a variety of different types of injuries that range from
relatively minor afflictions to serious and often fatal diseases. For example, in
the Agent Orange litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that exposure to the

herbicide caused injuries ranging from a serious skin ailment (chloracne) to
liver disease, cancers and death. Similarly, individuals exposed to asbestos
claim that asbestos fibers cause not only asbestosis and mesothelioma, but
also lung cancer, colon cancer, pharyngeal cancer, and other malignancies.
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In order to establish a workable compensation scheme, therefore, the
parties (or the fund administrators) must also define the types of injuries or
diseases that will be compensable. In addition, the administrators must define
the type of damage for which compensation will be paid. For instance, the
fund might limit compensation to claims of physical injury alone or it might
provide payment to claimants who suffer economic and non-economic loss, or
it might even distribute payments for emotional distress, enhanced risk of
disease, and derivative injuries (such as loss of consortium).
Another fundamental consideration in determining the compensation
formulas is the issue of the universe of eligible plaintiffs. As noted earlier,
mass tort situations typically involve latent injuries that may not manifest
themselves for several years following exposure. Indeed, the injurious
consequences of some mass torts manifest themselves in future generations.
Whether and how to cover claims that arise in the future is a crucial
consideration in structuring a compensation scheme. If future claims are to
be provided for, the compensation scheme must be arranged to ensure that
funds will not be depleted before such claims arise. One option for ensuring
that sufficient funds are available for future claims may be to set aside a
certain percentage of the compensation fund as an insurance fund that will
45
benefit claimants who become disabled in the future.
(ii). Causation/standardsof proof. Closely linked to the question of what
injuries to cover is the issue of causation-that is, to what extent should
causation play a role in the compensation formula? The answer to this
question will likely depend on the history of the litigation and the state of the
medical and scientific knowledge regarding the link between the harmful
substance and the injury.
In a typical case, compensation guidelines will give some degree of
consideration to the issue of causation. The fund administrators must
determine the type and amount of proof of causation that will be required in
order to receive compensation. Where proof of causation is difficult-for
example, where the injuries alleged could be caused by a variety of factors
other than the product at issue or where exposure to the product is difficult to
determine-an efficient compensation scheme might establish certain
assumptions regarding causation. These assumptions might include not only
assumptions about the categories or types of diseases or injuries that will be
presumed to have been caused by the harmful product, but also assumptions
regarding the existence of the disease or exposure to the product. Other
issues that must be determined include the appropriate treatment of potential
45. Determining how much money will be necessary to compensate future claims is a formidable
task in itself. This determination will involve a comprehensive analysis of existing claims, predictions
about the incidence of injury in the potential claimant population, and estimates about the number of
eligible persons who will actually seek compensation from the fund. The number of individuals who
actually assert claims in the future can depend on unpredictable factors such as notice of the
settlement fund's existence and the process established to file a claim.
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contributing causes of the injury at issue: will such causes affect the value of
the individual claim, or will they simply alter the plaintiffs' burden of proof?.
The assumptions and standards developed with respect to proof of
causation can be flexible. Assuming the claims resolution procedures provide
a degree of flexibility, the amount of compensation can be varied depending
in part on the amount and type of proof of causation available.
In some extreme cases, causation may be excluded from the compensation
scheme. Under the Agent Orange distribution plan, for example, claimants
are not required to demonstrate any causal relationship between their health
problems and exposure to Agent Orange. The court in the Agent Orange
litigation determined that requiring proof of individual causation would place
an unreasonable burden upon the plaintiffs because the scientific evidence
was not sufficiently certain to support a distribution plan that would limit
eligibility for compensation to individuals with specific diseases. Accordingly,
the distribution plan adopted by the court requires only that plaintiffs
demonstrate the existence of a disabling disease or death from a non46
traumatic source and a probability of exposure.
(iii). Legal issues. Various legal issues are also important in developing a
compensation system. As noted, mass tort cases often span numerous
jurisdictions and may even include claims filed in other countries. One factor
that must be considered in establishing a compensation scheme is whether
and how to take into account particular legal requirements, such as statutes of
limitations or limitations on damages, of the particular jurisdiction in which
the claim arose.
(iv). Personal characteristics. In an ordinary tort case, an individual
plaintiff's recovery might depend upon the jury's sympathy for the plaintiff's
situation, the existence of dependents, and intangible factors such as
extraordinary pain and suffering. In establishing settlement formulas, the
fund administrators must also consider whether and to what extent these
personal characteristics of individual plaintiffs should be taken into account.
b. Valuation of injuries. Finally, the fundamental and most important
issue that must be addressed in developing a compensation scheme is
establishing a method for determining the value of various injuries. Weighing
the value of, for example, cancer versus a thyroid deficiency versus a
particular birth defect can be perplexing, but it is a necessary task in the
development of compensation formulas. In the traditional litigation model,
claims are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account a variety of
factors, including the strength and credibility of the evidence, the plaintiff's
economic loss, the existence of dependents, intangibles such as pain and
suffering, and other factors that might have contributed to the injury. In
settling an individual tort claim, the parties may consider additional factors
46.

In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F Supp 1396, 1412-17 (ED NY 1985).
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such as the financial wherewithal of the defendant, the status of the litigation,
and the relative skill of the attorneys. In the context of a mass tort settlement
distribution, it seems advisable to develop some standardized procedures and
valuation methods in order to achieve the goal of providing fair compensation
with a minimum of transaction costs.
One method might be to establish claim values based on historical
compensation data. Such historical data can be compiled and analyzed to
reveal the effect of various factors on recovery in past claims arising out of the
47
same mass tort.
Deciding precisely what data to include in the analysis, however, involves
several questions. For example, should trial results be discounted by the
amount of punitive damages awarded? Should the available data be analyzed
on a national basis or on a regional basis? Should differences in state law be
factored into the analysis? Should the data be adjusted for inflation? Thus,
although the historical data, if available, may be the most justifiable basis for
determining settlement values, the task of collecting and analyzing this data is
complex and involves a number of difficult determinations.
This is not to say that the valuation of the injury must be the exclusive
determinant of a claimant's recovery. Other issues might also be considered.
For example, should the compensation formula account for the relative need
of individual claimants? In the Agent Orange case, for instance, the court
determined that the limited settlement fund should be distributed to those
who alleged the most severe injuries and who were most in need of
assistance. 48 Other issues to be considered include the impact of collateral
sources of recovery, such as insurance, and allowances for a particular
claimant's attorney's fees.
B.

Administration of the Settlement Fund-Establishing a Claims
Resolution Facility

Once agreement has been reached on the compensation scheme, the
actual mechanism for holding and disbursing monies can be established. The
first decision concerning the administration of a settlement fund is to identify
some individual or group to administer the fund. In some cases, the parties'
attorneys (principally the plaintiffs' attorneys) will take responsibility for
administering and distributing the fund. In other cases, the court, or a courtappointed entity or official, might administer the fund. Alternatively, the
parties might establish a separate trust, as in the Dalkon Shield example, for
the purpose of holding and administering the settlement fund.
The next administrative decision is to determine what type of facility, if
any, should be established or selected to manage individual claims. Whether
administration of the settlement fund will require a full-fledged claims
47. A software package was developed to analyze historic data regarding settlement of Dalkon
Shield claims. See Carol Angel, Lawyers Design Dalkon Settlement Software, 10i Los Angeles DailyJ 5 col
I (July 8, 1988).
48. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F Supp 1396 (ED NY 1985).
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resolution/distribution facility depends on the particular situation. Factors
relevant to whether an independent facility is necessary include the number of
claims involved, the length of time over which the fund will be distributed,
and the method by which individuals are to be compensated. For example, if
the overall settlement plan calls for individual negotiation and settlement of a
relatively small number of cases (or groups of cases), an independent facility
may not be necessary. Rather, the parties may be able to set certain standards
for evaluation of individual claims and then handle the individual settlement
negotiations without the assistance of a separate professional staff. On the
other hand, if the overall settlement agreement envisions streamlined
(perhaps even computerized) processing of a massive number of claims, an
independent facility run by a professional staff may be necessary to administer
the distribution procedure.
1. Establishing a Claims Facility. Essentially, two basic options are available
for establishing a facility to conduct the actual claims processing activity
necessary to distribute funds to large numbers of claimants. The
administrator of the settlement fund can create an in-house mechanism for
receiving and processing claims; alternatively the administrator can enter into
agreements with outside contractors to provide the necessary services. 49
There are advantages and disadvantages to both of these options. Hiring
an outside contractor has a certain appeal because it presumably avoids the
need to create new bureaucracy. By setting up its own in-house facility, the
settlement fund or trust acquires all the costs and responsibilities of an
ordinary business: it must enter into employment agreements, pay
appropriate employee benefits and taxes, obtain various types of liability
insurance, enter into rental agreements, and purchase furniture and
equipment; it must also maintain (or service) these items. These efforts could
be too costly and burdensome, particularly if the settlement fund is to be
distributed over a short period of time.
Use of an outside contractor is especially appealing where the tasks to be
performed and the decisions to be made are well within the expertise of the
contractor. Thus, by hiring existing entities, the settlement fund
administrators or trustees can draw upon the institutional knowledge and
experience of the contractor. However, this perceived advantage may be
illusory. If the settlement fund is to be distributed over a relatively short
period of time, the contractor may be unable or unwilling to commit its
permanent staff to performing the claims administration functions. Rather,
the contractor may rely on part-time and temporary employees, thereby
nullifying some of the advantages of hiring a contractor with institutional
expertise.
49. Contractors capable of operating a claims facility might include insurance companies with
expertise in handling similar types of claims, third-party administrators-that is, entities that typically
act as subcontractors to insurance carriers and are experienced in processing large volumes of
claims-or even consulting firms.
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Unlike hiring outside contractors, establishment of an in-house facility has
the distinct advantage of allowing the settlement administrators to exercise
complete control over the operation and to centralize all decision-making. An
outside contractor may have institutional needs and concerns that could
conflict with the needs of the settlement fund administrators. This could lead
to misunderstandings and disputes regarding the activities and priorities of
50
the contractor.
The settlement fund administrator must weigh several factors to
determine which of the two options best suit the fund's needs. For instance,
the duration of the fund distribution activities can be a key factor in selecting
a claims facility. As noted, if the fund is to be distributed over a short period,
it might be most advantageous to hire an existing contractor. The fund will
have to determine whether the cost savings are likely to outweigh the
potential disadvantages of utilizing an outside contractor. If, on the other
hand, the fund will be distributed over a period of several years, the expense
of establishing an in-house facility might be justified. In addition, the
administrator should consider the substantive distribution guidelines. If the
requirements for obtaining compensation from the fund require judgments
within the expertise of an existing contractor, it might be most advantageous
to contract for services. Each settlement will have different needs and
concerns, each of which must be evaluated in determining the appropriate
facility for administering claims.
2. Payment/FundManagement. Another administrative issue confronting the
parties is the establishment of a system for collecting, holding, and managing
the funds prior to distribution to the eligible plaintiffs. First, the parties must
determine how this aggregate amount is to be paid by the defendants. There
are several options. The defendants might prefer to pay the agreed upon
amount into an account in one lump-sum. The account would hold the funds
pending distribution. This is essentially the method used in the Agent
Orange litigation. 51 Similarly, under the Dalkon Shield settlement, the Trust
52
received the bulk of its funding in one lump-sum payment.
Alternatively, the funds could be paid over a period of time, using a
method similar to that used in a traditional structured settlement. This
approach has the advantage of minimizing the initial financial impact on the
defendants but has the disadvantage of postponing the defendants' goal of
achieving total peace. Moreover, if an installment payment system is used, the
50. For example, the company may be structured in such a way as to require the cooperation of
several different departments in completing one task for the settlement fund. Since each department
is likely to have responsibilities other than to the fund, it may be difficult for the contractor to commit
to providing all the services desired by the fund quickly.
51. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F Supp 740 (ED NY 1984), modified, 818
F2d 145 (2d Cir 1987).
52. See generally Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, Sixth Amended and Restated Plan of
Reorganization Disclosure Statement ("Disclosure Statement").
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plaintiffs are likely to demand assurance that the defendants will be able to
comply with the obligation.
Second, the parties or the settlement fund administrator must determine
how to manage the monies pending distribution. In a mass tort settlement,
distribution is likely to take years. Accordingly, the funds must be managed in
such a way as to both assure that sufficient monies will be available for
distribution and that the funds will be secure. The settlement fund
administrators or trustees will probably enter into an arrangement with
investment managers and banking institutions to both manage the investment
of funds and arrange for liquidation and disbursement when necessary. The
fund administrators will have to establish guidelines for the investment of
funds to assure the degrees of security and liquidity necessary to meet the
fund's obligations.
Finally, in establishing a settlement fund and delivery system, the parties
and/or the fund administrator must consider the tax consequences of the
fund and its distribution activities. Depending on how the fund is organized,
it may be deemed an entity subject to tax under both state and federal tax
laws. Moreover, depending on the composition of the settlement fund,
payments or portions of payments to individual plaintiffs may be taxable. If
so, the settlement fund may be required to institute appropriate tax
withholding and reporting procedures.
IV
CASE HISTORY:

THE DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST

The resolution of the Dalkon Shield personal injury cases illustrates the
process, issues, and difficulties involved in implementing an aggregate
resolution of a mass tort controversy and in establishing a mechanism for
settling the individual claims.
A.

Background

The Dalkon Shield litigation began in 1971 when a number of women who
had used the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device began filing lawsuits against
the A.H. Robins, Co. ("Robins"), the sole manufacturer and distributor of the
device. The women claimed that the Dalkon Shield caused a variety of
injuries, including ectopic pregnancy and septic abortion. Most claimants
sought both compensatory and punitive damages on a variety of theories,
including negligence and negligent design, strict products liability, breach of
express and implied warranties, and wanton and reckless conduct. By 1985,
Robins had disposed of more than 9,000 claims and faced an additional 5,000
cases pending in state and federal courts. At this point, Robins and its insurer
had paid out approximately $530 million in both compensatory and punitive
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damages to individuals who had been injured in some manner by the Dalkon
53
Shield.
By 1974, when it discontinued sales of the device, Robins had sold
approximately 2.2 million Dalkon Shields. The mounting number of personal
injury claims and the enormous potential liability led Robins to seek
protection under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On August 21, 1985,
Robins filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court.
The bankruptcy proceeding was conducted by Judge Robert A. Merhige, Jr.,
54
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia.
B.

Aggregate Resolution

After filing for bankruptcy, Robins took two actions that ultimately
enabled it to achieve a comprehensive and final resolution of all the personal
injury claims. First, Robins sought to establish a "bar date" by which all
individuals who potentially had a personal injury claim against Robins
resulting from the Dalkon Shield must file a claim. Upon Robins's motion,
the court ordered that all present and future Dalkon Shield personal injury
claimants must file a claim by April 30, 1986 or they would be barred from
seeking compensation for an injury related to the Dalkon Shield. 55 By
instituting the bankruptcy proceeding and establishing this bar date, Robins
effectively consolidated all present and future Dalkon Shield personal injury
claims in one forum, making it possible to resolve its total liability in one
action.
Second, Robins proposed the establishment of a "closed fund" from
which all Dalkon Shield personal injury claimants (both present and future)
would receive compensation. Representatives of the claimants opposed the
proposal, arguing that the claimants should not shoulder the risk of an
inadequate fund. They proposed that Robins be sold and the proceeds used
to pay the claimants 56 or, in the alternative, that an unrestricted fund be
created from which the claims would be satisfied.
To resolve this dispute, Judge Merhige appointed an expert to devise a
mechanism for estimating the value of the Dalkon Shield personal injury
claims. 5 7 If the total value of the claims could be determined, the parties
53.
54.

In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F2d at 717.
In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 BR 742 (ED Va 1988).

55. Id at 745. Robins spent several million dollars in advertising costs in an attempt to notify
potential claimants of this bar date. Ultimately, over 300,000 individuals filed claims in response to
the advertising effort. After invalid claims were eliminated through distribution of questionnaires,
approximately 195,000 claims remained. Id. The guidelines ultimately adopted for distribution of
compensation to Dalkon Shield claimants include provisions for paying "late claims" under certain
conditions.
56. Under bankruptcy law, the personal injury claimants take priority over the equity holders.
11 USC § 1171. Thus, all personal injury claimants had to be satisfied before any money was
allocated to equity.
57. In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 88 BR at 746 (appointing Francis E. McGovern). Section 502(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code requires that any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidating of
which would delay the administration of the case, shall be estimated. 11 USC § 502(c). To try each
claim separately would likely have consumed Robins's assets. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
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might be able to agree on establishing a fund to compensate all personal
injury claims. Even if the parties could not agree on establishing a fund, the
court could use the evidence developed in the estimation process to
determine Robins's total liability for the Dalkon Shield personal injury claims.
The activities of the court-appointed expert in the Robins bankruptcy
encompassed two areas: development of guidelines for distribution of a fund
to Dalkon Shield claimants and collection of the information necessary to
58
place an aggregate value on the present and future claims.
The data collection was designed and conducted so as to obtain the same
type of information that would ordinarily be used in evaluating any individual
personal injury case. In other words, the data collection activities were based
on a litigation model, using instruments similar to those normally used in
litigation. Questionnaires distributed to claimants incorporated the same sort
of questions that would be asked in interrogatories or depositions. There
were some obvious limitations. The collection of massive data cannot
possibly take into account such personal characteristics as the credibility or
the sympathetic nature of particular plaintiffs, which would be factors in
evaluating individual cases.
The data collection included extensive examination of a sample of the
9,000 claims that had already been resolved and distribution of a
questionnaire to several thousand claimants who were randomly selected
from the group of pending claims. 5 9 The questionnaire sought information
on such items as medical history, use of the Dalkon Shield, medical problems,
illness or injury claims related to the Dalkon Shield, claims of future
problems, and financial losses. 60 The data were used to compile a
comprehensive database that contained a record of historical litigation and
settlement data as well as a profile of existing claims. The information
gathered through this process was then distributed to the parties for use in
preparing their own estimates of the aggregate value of the claims. The
process of collecting, reviewing, and compiling the evidence of the value of
the claims took more than one year.
In the fall of 1987, Judge Merhige held extensive hearings at which each of
the parties' various experts testified as to their estimation of the amount of
money that would be necessary to compensate existing and future claims.
suggested that the district court "arrive at a fair estimation of the value of all the claims." A.H. Robins
v Piccinin, 788 F2d at 1013.
58. In re A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 880 F2d at 699. It was assumed that the parties and the court
would be unable to estimate the value of the claims without a reasonable understanding of the
conditions under which payments would be distributed. The claims resolution guidelines eventually
adopted are described in detail in Part IVE.
59. Examination of the previously resolved claims included a re-creation of complete litigation
files for each individual in the sample. Once this information was collected, medical reviewers
compiled and coded medical information. The theory behind this process was that comprehensive
historical data on the factors that determined the value of particular claims could be used to estimate
the value of the unresolved claims once the characteristics of the pending claims were analyzed.
60. The information collected from pending claimants was quite extensive. A fifty-page form
was sent to 6,000 individuals, who also were asked to submit medical records.
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The proposed value of the claims ranged from $800 million (suggested by
Robins) to $7 billion (suggested by the "Claimants Committee," a group of
attorneys that represented the Dalkon Shield plaintiffs). 6 ' According to the
experts who compiled the data, the variation in the estimated aggregate value
of the claims was attributable to different assumptions regarding such issues
as the applicability of statutes of limitations, the level and type of proof of
both Dalkon Shield use and injury that should be required to obtain
compensation, the effect of potential alternative causes of the injury, the
evaluation of the historical cases, and the number of individuals who would
pursue claims.
After hearing the evidence submitted by the parties, the district court
determined that the aggregate value of the claims was $2.475 billion, payable
over a reasonable period of time. 62 This determination of the aggregate
liability paved the way for Robins to pursue a merger in order to reorganize
the company. In February 1988, Robins reached an agreement with American
Home Products ("American Home") under which Robins would be merged
into a subsidiary of American Home. On March 28, 1988, Robins submitted
to the court a consensual plan of reorganization that called for the
establishment of a trust fund, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust ("the
Trust"), to provide compensation for individuals claiming injury from the
Dalkon Shield. 63 Under this plan, neither Robins nor American Home would
have any potential liability for Dalkon Shield claims. Rather, the Trust would
assume all such liability. The bulk of the money used to fund the Trust would
be generated by the merger. 6 4
C.

The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust

Under the plan of reorganization, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust was
established as a Designated Settlement Fund under the Internal Revenue
Code. 6 5 The Trust assumes the liability of Robins and Robins's successors for
Dalkon Shield personal injury claims, and is required to satisfy such claims
"fairly and expeditiously," according to guidelines set forth in the plan of
reorganization. A central feature of the plan is an injunction against any
action, except malpractice actions, by Dalkon Shield claimants against any
person or entity other than the Trust for Dalkon Shield related claims. The
Trust agreement provides for the appointment of five trustees who are
61. Robins estimated that claims would total between $0.8 and $1.3 billion, while the Claimants
Committee's estimate was $4.2 to $7 billion. The other estimates were: $1.03 billion (equity security
holders), $1.54 billion (unsecured creditors), and $2.2 to $2.5 billion (Aetna). In re A.H. Robins Co.,

880 F2d at 699.
62.

In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 BR at 747.

63. Robins's proposed plan of reorganization was confirmed by the district court on July 26,
1988. In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 BR 742. As discussed in more detail in Part IVD, the district court's
decision was affirmed. 880 F2d 694 (4th Cir), cert denied, 110 US 331 (1989).
64.

In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F2d at 720-21.

65.

26 USC § 468B.
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responsible for carrying out all operations and activities of the Trust,
66
including investing and managing the Trust's assets.
The Trust received funds from several sources. The primary source of
funds for the Trust was the money generated by the merger between Robins
and American Home. Robins was required to pay $2.255 billion into the
Trust once the plan became final, that is, after all appeals were exhausted. 6 7
In addition, the Trust received $5 million from E. Claiborne Robins and E.
Claiborne Robins, Jr., as well as funds from the settlement of a class action
suit (commonly referred to as the Breland case) brought by Dalkon Shield
claimants against Aetna (Robins's insurer) alleging that Aetna and Robins had
improperly settled litigation regarding the scope of Robins's insurance
coverage. 68 Under the Breland settlement, approved by the district court in
July 1988 and by the Fourth Circuit inJune 1989, the Trust receives: (1) $250
million in insurance from Aetna, (2) $50 million cash from Aetna, and (3) $25
million cash from the successor corporation, to be paid out of Aetna money.
Finally, the Trust will receive approximately $45 million in unused insurance
that Robins holds for the Dalkon Shield, and it may also receive funds from
69
the Dalkon Shield Other Claimants Trust.
D.

Appeals

After the plan of reorganization was confirmed by the district court on July
26, 1988,70 various plaintiffs' attorneys appealed. For example, a group of
Dalkon Shield claimants who voted against the Plan challenged four aspects of
it. 7 1 First, they challenged the district court's approval of the disclosure
66. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F2d at 700.
67. Disclosure Statement at 37 (cited in note 52).
68. Shortly after Robins filed the bankruptcy petition, a number of Dalkon Shield claimants filed
a class action suit against Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Robins's Insurer) as well as Robins's
officers to recover for injuries resulting from the use of the Dalkon Shield. Breland v Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 88 BR 755 (ED Va 1988). Although the case was originally filed in the District of
Minnesota, it was transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, where the Robins bankruptcy case
was proceeding. The claimants alleged that Aetna was jointly liable with Robins and others for
Dalkon Shield injuries under a theory of joint enterprise or conspiracy. They contended that Aetna
was an active participant in the development and promotion of the Shield and was responsible
equally with Robins for Robins's failure to recall the Shield until 1984. The court certified two
separate classes of claimants consisting of persons who had filed timely claims against Robins and
persons who had not. Ultimately the Breland plaintiffs and Aetna agreed to a settlement under which
Aetna would contribute to the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust established under Robins's plan of
reorganization and provide some insurance if the Trust fund proved to be insufficient. The
settlement does not, however, provide for the contribution of unlimited funds should the Trust have
insufficient monies to pay all claimants. As noted, the Breland settlement was affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit. In re A.H. Robins & Co., 880 F2d 709 (4th Cir 1989). A petition for certiorari was filed on
September 14, 1989, sub nom Anderson v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari on November 6, 1989. 110 S Ct 376.
69. Under the plan of reorganization, Robins is to establish the "Dalkon Shield Other Claimants
Trust." The purpose of this trust is to pay claims other than personal injury claims or related claims.
This trust will provide compensation for claims for indemnification of doctors and hospitals.
Disclosure Statement Annex 1 at PLN-9-12 (cited in note 52).
70. In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 BR 742.
71. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F2d 694.

Page 79: Autumn 1990]

DALKON SHIELD TRUST

statement contained in the Plan. 72 Second, they disagreed with the district
court's use of a one claimant/one vote voting procedure. 73 Third, they
disputed the district court's finding that the Plan was "feasible"-that is,
would pay all claimants in full and avoid the need for further reorganization. 74
Finally, they challenged the provision enjoining all suits by Dalkon Shield
victims against third parties. 7 5 The Fourth Circuit rejected these challenges
and upheld the Plan on June 16, 1989.76 On September 14, 1989, these
claimants filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court
challenging the injunction prohibiting actions against third-party joint
tortfeasors. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 6, 1989. 7 7
E.

Distribution Mechanism-The Dalkon Shield Claims Resolution Facility

The compensation scheme established by the Dalkon Shield Claimants
Trust illustrates both the complexities of developing a workable distribution
procedure and the issues involved in determining settlement values. Under
the claims resolution guidelines set forth in the Trust agreement, claimants
may select one of three options for obtaining compensation. 78 Each of the
options employs a different compensation formula and a different means of
evaluating claims.
The Dalkon Shield claims resolution guidelines are based on the
assumption that different claims resolution techniques are appropriate for
different claimants and that the claimant is in the best position to determine
the optimum procedure for resolving the claim. In general, the various
options represent a trade-off between speed and level of recovery, on the one
hand, and evidentiary requirements and evaluation of individual factors, on
the other. The options range from a simple flat payment schedule, offering
modest sums for applicants with minor injuries, to an intensive, individualized
negotiation/litigation process. By allowing the claimants to select the
resolution option, the fund presumably avoids the need to expend its limited
72. The claimants argued that the disclosure statement contained in the plan did not contain
sufficient information for them to determine whether to support the plan. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the statement to be adequate.
Id at 697-98.
73. The claimants argued that the district court violated statutory procedures for voting on the
plan contained in 11 USC § 1126(a) by assigning the value of one dollar to each Dalkon Shield claim.
The claimants contended that the statute mandates weighted voting. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that any error was "harmless" in light of the overwhelming vote in favor of the plan. Id.
74. The claimants challenged the district court's failure to clarify the components of its
determination that $2.475 billion would be sufficient to pay all the claims. The Fourth Circuit
concluded that the estimate of $2.475 billion was not clearly erroneous. Id at 698-700.
75. The claimants challenged the plan's imposition of a permanent injunction barring Dalkon
Shield claimants from obtaining recovery against third-party joint tortfeasors such as officers and
attorneys, doctors, clinics, hospitals, and distributors of the Dalkon Shield. The claimants contended
that suits against such third parties may be the only way to provide payment in full to Dalkon Shield
claimants should the Trust prove to have insufficient funds. Id at 700-01.
76.
77.

In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F2d 694.
Menard-Sanford v A. H. Robins Co., 110 S Ct 376 (1989).

78. Claimants may elect a fourth option under which they can defer consideration of their claim.
Disclosure Statement Annex 4, Exhibit C par 4 (cited in note 52).
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resources culling out weak or illegitimate claims. Those individuals who are
unable or unwilling to produce any substantial evidence of a Dalkon Shield
related injury or who have suffered only minor injuries would presumably
select the "modest payment" option. Individuals with stronger evidence or
greater injuries will be inclined to select an option providing for a more
intensive and more individualized resolution, which is likely to produce a
larger payment. The discussion following presents an overview of each of the
available options.
1. Option 1-Short Form. Option 1 establishes a quick payment scheme for
claims involving minor injury or where the claimant cannot demonstrate
Dalkon Shield use. It is intended to encourage quick and efficient resolution
of de minimis claims. The claimant receives only a modest payment but is not
required to submit detailed proof of injury. Instead, the claimant need only
execute an affidavit attesting that she used the Dalkon Shield and was injured
(or believes she may have been injured) or that he or she was injured because
of another person's use of a Dalkon Shield. By instituting this de minimis
payment option, the Trust has opted for a cost-efficient approach to the issue
of potentially illegitimate claims. The assumption is that it is less expensive to
pay a modest sum to a claimant with no proof of harm related to the Dalkon
Shield than to investigate the legitimacy of such claims. Because the claimant
decides whether to pursue this option-that is, the claimant may decide to
forgo option one and pursue the other option-the possibility that individuals
with legitimate and valuable claims will be underpaid is minimized.
The Trust has established three levels of payments for claimants who elect
to proceed under Option 1: Persons who assert a personal injury as a result
of using the Dalkon Shield receive a lump sum of $725; persons who assert a
derivative injury receive $300; and persons whose documentation reveals a
conflict (for example, persons who actually may have used a different
intrauterine device) receive $125. Approximately 40 percent of all active
claims have been resolved through Option 1. As of August 30, 1989, the
Trust had paid 80,538 Option 1 claimants a total of $52,183,875.
2. Option 2-Claim Form/TailoredOffer. Option 2 is intended to be used to
resolve the bulk of Dalkon Shield claims. Under Option 2, the trustees
developed a payment schedule setting forth specified settlement amounts for
a number of compensable injuries as set forth in the Trust agreement. These
injuries include pelvic inflammatory disease, perforation caused by the Shield,
and abortion occurring as a result of pregnancy while the Shield was in place.
(The trustees may add other injuries to the current list of compensable
injuries.)
Under Option 2, claimants generally will receive a higher payment than
under Option 1. However, to obtain that payment, the claimant must produce
significantly more evidence of injury. The claimant is required to attest to
specific injuries and to answer questions under oath regarding the use of the
Dalkon Shield. Claimants must also submit medical records or an affidavit of
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a health care provider evidencing Dalkon Shield use as well as medical records
documenting the injury. If a claimant selects Option 2, the Trust waives all
defenses to the claim, except for challenges based on such factors as duplicate
claims, late filing, and disallowed claims.
Whether to accept the Option 2 payment schedule is at the sole discretion
of the claimant. However, once a claimant elects to proceed under Option 2,
the claimant may not proceed to Option 3 unless she or he was denied
79
compensation by the Trust under Option 2.
Option 2 is intended to provide moderate, standardized payments to
individuals with relatively mild injuries. The assumption underlying the
Option 2 scheduled payments is that the majority of the remaining claims do
not involve the sort of substantial and serious injuries that require
individualized examination and evaluation to determine an appropriate
payment level. Payments available under Option 2 range from $400 for a loss
of consortium claim by the spouse of a Dalkon Shield user to $5,500 for a user
who had certain conditions (such as pelvic inflammatory disease) that resulted
in nonvoluntary sterilizing surgery. Among the injuries that may be
compensated under Option 2 are birth defects, infant death and septic
absorption caused by pregnancy while the shield was inserted, 0 nonsurgical
infertility, 8 ' pelvic inflammatory disease,8 2 uncontrolled bleeding,8 3 and
84
perforation or embodiment of the Shield resulting in surgical removal.
Option 2 will be a success if the payment schedule is attractive to a large
number of claimants. As of August 1991, a total of 15,679 individuals had
applied for Option 2 payments. Of the 11,844 individuals who fulfilled the
Option 2 requirements, 11,401 have received compensation totalling $32
million.
3. Option 3-Complete Form/Early Evaluation/Offer/Arbitration/Trial.Claimants
who do not resolve their claims under Options 1 or 2 may proceed under
Option 3. Option 3 claims are to be treated in a more individualized
fashion. Under this option, the Trust is required to evaluate each claim based
on several criteria, including the quantum and quality of the evidence
supporting the claim, the absence of discovery, and the waiver of defenses.
The Trust is to compare the individual claim against historical profiles of
similar claims and, based on this comparison, determine an appropriate
settlement value for the claim.
Under Option 3, the claimant must submit a comprehensive information
form and medical records detailing both use of the Dalkon Shield and injuries
79. Id. at Exhibit D.
80. The payment schedule
$2,500 for septic abortion.
81. The payment schedule
82. The payment schedule
83. The payment schedule
84. The payment schedule

provides $1,150 for such birth defects, $3,200 for infant death, and
provides
provides
provides
provides

$3,900 for this condition.
$1,250 for this condition.
$850 for this condition.
$1,500 for this condition.
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resulting from its use. Option 3 is divided into several levels, each involving
different procedures and types of proof.
a. Level one--early evaluation/offer. Under Option 3, the Trust must first
evaluate the claim using the following procedures:
(1) The Trust must develop a profile of the claim based on criteria
relevant to the value of the case (relevant criteria include the nature
of the injury, the medical evidence available to prove the injury and
Dalkon Shield use, the presence of other potential causes of the
injury, and the length of time since the injury);
(2) the Trust must then compare the profile to other claim profiles
based on historical data; and
(3) the Trust must establish a payment amount for the claim, taking
into account historical data, the amount and quality of the evidence,
the absence of in-depth discovery, and the waiver of certain defenses
by the Trust.
Next, based on this evaluation, the Trust is obligated to make an offer to
the claimant. The offer must include a statement of reasons for the offer. The
claimant must accept or reject the offer in writing. If the claimant rejects the
offer, she may make a counteroffer. If the parties do not resolve the matter
through this offer/counteroffer process, the claim will proceed to the next
level.
b. Level two-in-depth evaluation/offer/settlement conference or alternativedispute
resolution. If the claim is not resolved at level one, the Trust is to undertake
an in-depth review of the claim and invite the claimant to a voluntary
settlement conference or other voluntary alternative dispute resolution
process. This conference is to be held at a location convenient to the
claimant. The claimant (or her representative) and a representative of the
Trust must be present at the conference. Either side may also have legal
counsel present. No later than sixty days after the conference, each side must
submit a written settlement proposal to the other side. These offers are to
remain in effect until ninety days after the conference. If the parties do not
agree, the claimant may proceed to level 3-binding arbitration or trial.
c. Level three-bindingarbitration/trial. If the claimant elects binding arbitration, a neutral third party8 5 is to select an arbitrator. The arbitration is to
be held in a location that minimizes travel for the claimant. In evaluating the
claim, the arbitrator may consider the record, the offers made by each side,
medical evidence, and the parties' arguments. Both the Trust and the
claimant may be represented by advocates. The arbitrator may also solicit
85. In April 1991, the Trust selected the Private Adjudication Center, Inc., which is affiliated
with the Duke University School of Law, as the neutral third party responsible for handling the
procedural matters related to the binding arbitration related to the Trust.
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independent advice from a panel of doctors or other experts maintained by
the Trust. In binding arbitration, the Trust may assert all defenses except
product defect. The arbitrator is to issue a written award-enforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act-or denial of the claim. If the claimant elects to
go to trial, she or he must file a complaint in the appropriate venue, naming
the Trust as defendant. The claimant has a right to a trial by jury. The claim
will be handled pursuant to the rules governing litigation in the court in which
the case is filed.
d. Summary of option 3. The individualized claim resolution process
envisioned in Option 3 will be significantly more costly and time consuming
to implement than either Options 1 or 2. If, after Option 2 claims are
resolved, the Trust is left with relatively few claims, the process of individual
evaluation and negotiation should not prove unduly burdensome or costly. If,
however, a significant number of claimants reject Option 2, the Trust could
find itself overwhelmed by the Option 3 process.
The accuracy of the court's estimate of the aggregate value of the claims
will be put to the test at this stage. The aggregate estimate necessarily
included assumptions about the number of claimants who would pursue
claims beyond Options 1 and 2. Should fewer individuals than expected
resolve their claims under Options 1 and 2, the Trust may face the possibility
that insufficient funds will be available to administer and pay Option 3 claims.
Whether the Trust can manage the Option 3 claims process in a cost effective
and timely manner depends to a large extent on the Trust's success in
resolving claims under Option 2.
F.

Establishment of a Claims Facility

The trustees of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust decided to establish an
in-house facility to handle all aspects (except investment) of claims resolution.
The Dalkon Shield Claims Resolution Facility ("the Facility") occupies 20,000
square feet of office space in downtown Richmond, Virginia, and is
administered by a professional staff hired by the Trust. Michael Sheppard, a
former Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Court, previously responsible
for maintaining Dalkon Shield files during the bankruptcy proceedings, is the
Facility's director. The Facility currently has a staff of 280 permanent
employees, including 105 in claims evaluation, 74 in operations, 33 in
personal contacts, 18 in the legal department, and others in data processing,
accounting, and personnel.
The Facility staff is responsible for distributing information and
application materials to claimants, receiving, reviewing, and processing claim
files, and determining the appropriate payment under the payment guidelines
established by the Trust. In addition to its claims processing function, the
Facility maintains toll-free telephone lines and a staff of claims
representatives. The rules governing the Facility require it to provide each
claimant with a "trust contact," who will be responsible for assisting the
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claimant in submitting a claim, answering questions about the claim process,
and directing claimants to legal or medical advice and to other counseling.8 6
Actual delivery of payments is performed by a bank under contract with the
Trust.
G.

The Dalkon Shield Solution-An Evaluation

The Robins bankruptcy and the eventual establishment of the Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust illustrate the advantages of an aggregate resolution of
mass tort claims. The actions taken in the bankruptcy proceeding enabled
Robins to achieve the comprehensive resolution of all claims-both present
and future-sought by all defendants involved in mass tort controversies.
Litigation that had burdened Robins and the Courts for nearly fifteen years at
the time the bankruptcy action was filed has, for the most part, been put to
rest. A large percentage of the plaintiffs will receive compensation promptly,
and the courts and parties will avoid the protracted and costly process of
litigating thousands of individual cases.
The Dalkon Shield Claims Resolution Facility illustrates the spectrum of
procedures that might be used in distributing funds to a mass of claimants
after the settlement of a mass tort controversy. The experience of the Dalkon
Shield claims resolution plan is thus likely to play an important role in the
development of future mass tort compensation schemes. The following
discussion addresses some of the advantages and disadvantages of the Dalkon
Shield mechanism based on the experience of the Trust to date.
1. Evaluation of the Dalkon Shield Claims Resolution Mechanism.

As noted

above, the claims resolution facility established for the Dalkon Shield

Claimants Trust illustrates the spectrum of mechanisms available for
distributing funds. The Option 1 procedure offers a simple, fixed payment
schedule that does not take into account in any respect the facts of a particular
claim. The Option 2 procedure involves a slightly more complicated payment
schedule that will offer some variation in payment depending on the type and
degree of injury. Option 3 offers a range of procedures, each of which
involves an individualized examination of the claim. Option 1 is of course the
least expensive procedure to administer while Option 3 is likely to be the most
costly. Option 1 will provide compensation quickly, while resolution of a
claim under Option 3 is likely to take significantly more time.
This multi-tiered approach is appealing. The critics' concerns about the
dehumanization of an administrative compensation scheme should be
minimized by the ability to select from among several approaches and the
plaintiffs' availability of the litigation-type approach in Option 3. Presumably,
because each individual plaintiff can select the approach most appropriate to
his or her particular situation, the possibility that relatively strong claims will
be underpaid and relatively weak claims overpaid will be minimized. If this
86. Disclosure Statement Annex 4, at CRF-5 (cited in note 52).
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presumption is borne out, it should effectively answer the critics' charge that a
mass resolution procedure is inherently unfair because it inevitably averages
settlement values. Moreover, the availability of the Option 1 quick payment
should help minimize administrative costs. One difficulty in developing an
effective mechanism for delivering compensation in the mass tort context is
achieving the appropriate balance between the need to scrutinize individual
claims for legitimacy and value and the need to minimize administrative
expenses. By allowing claimants themselves to select the Option 1 payment,
the Trust has in effect eliminated the costs associated with identifying the
weak or illegitimate claims.
On the other hand, allowing the individual claimant to select the
appropriate resolution option could lead to undesirable results. There is a
danger that the less educated, less aggressive, and more impecunious
claimants will select the quick and easy Option I payment scheme, even if they
may have a more valuable claim. However, a preliminary analysis of the
113,000 individuals who have already received a settlement under Option 1
indicates that this undesirable result has not occurred. A comparison of the
claims paid against the comprehensive claim database compiled during the
bankruptcy proceedings reveals that less than 1 percent of the claims settled
under Option 1 demonstrate characteristics associated with a more valuable
claim.
Allowing the individual claimants to select the claim resolution option also
has certain risks for the Trust. Because the Trust cannot control the volume
of claims processed under each option, the Trust will be unable to project the
administrative costs of settling the outstanding claims with a high degree of
certainty.
2.

Implicationsfor Future Mass Tort Controversies.

Because the Dalkon Shield

Trust has been distributing funds only recently, there is not as yet sufficient
information to evaluate the success of the claims resolution procedures. At
this preliminary stage, however, it appears that this multi-tiered approach
might provide an optimal mechanism for resolving individual claims in a mass
tort settlement. The de minimis payment offered under Option 1 disposed of
40 percent of the claims in a few months' time. The claimants would never be
able to achieve such results under the traditional tort approach.8 7 The critical
test of the Dalkon Shield claims resolution method is the implementation of
Option 2. In order to operate successfully, the Trust must resolve the bulk of
the remaining claims under Option 2. Option 2 is intended to provide the
means for resolving moderately valuable claims with a minimum of
administrative costs. If the Trust is able to attract large numbers of claimants
87. Some might argue that this achievement is of dubious value because the iypc of claims
settled under ()plion I wi uld nol ordinarily arise il the traditional tort ontexI. lhe procedural
requt entenis and econooli( costs associated with Ihe tort systt ci -eale certain harriers to access that
would discourage the tiling of weak or uncertain lai is.
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to Option 2 while, at the same time, retaining sufficient funds to satisfy the
more difficult and more costly Option 3 claims, the mechanism will be a
success.

